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IN THE SUPREHE COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION, 
a municipal corporation of 
the State of Utah, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, Case No. 14659 
vs. 
UTAH WOOL PULLING COMPANY, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES 
COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
THE SUPREME 
Appellant, Salt Lake City Corporation, respectfully 
petitions the Court for a rehearing on its opinion filed in 
the above-entitled cause on July 5, 1977. The grounds for this 
petition and the points wherein the Appellant alleges this 
Court has erred are the following: 
1. The controlling opinion erroneously states that 
plaintiff contends the value of the defendant's water rights 
was the value of the defendant's diversionary facilities. 
2. The controlling opinion erred in allowing the valua-
tion of the water rights as part of the property which already 
had been paid for. 
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3. The controlling opinion erred in assuming that plain-
tiff condemned the water rights and received them. 
4. The controlling opinion ignores the difference between 
situations where water rights are valuable and third parties can-
not obtain them or similar ones for the reason that they are not 
sold or cannot be obtained by application, and where the right 
is so readily available by purchase or application, that no one 
will buy. 
5. The controlling opinion erred in upholding and accepting 




THE CONTROLLING OPINION ERRONEOUSLY STATES THAT PLAINTIFF CONTENDS 
THE VALUE OF THE DEFENDANT'S WATER RIGHTS i'JAS THE VALUE OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S DIVERSIONARY FACILITIES. 
The controlling opinion is based in part on the statement 
that the plaintiff contended the value of the defendant's water 
rights was the value of the defendant's diversionary facility. 
This is not correct. The plaintiff contends that the defendant's 
water rights alone had a value which was determinable separate 
and apart from all other facilities for diversion and use, all 
of which had been previously paid for by the plaintiff. 
It is well settled that a certified water right, riparian 
or otherwise, is separable from the land and can be separately 
conveyed and considered. 78 Am Jur 2d, \'Vaters, Section 242, states 
as follows: 
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As a general proposi~ion, subject to statutory 
or contractual restr1ct1ons, all rights to water 
riparian or otherwise, may be severed from the ' 
lands to which t~ey are attached, and separately 
conveyed ... The r1ght to sell a water right free 
from the land for which it was appropriated is 
not cut_off by statutes requiring an intending 
appropr1ator to apply to state officers for a 
permit and to describe accurately the land on 
which the water is to be used. 
The sale of a water right separately from the land 
to which it was first applied is not a sale of 
the water, but a right to use water. (emphasis 
added) 
It has been the contention of plaintiff throughout this 
case that the defendant's water right, by stipulation of the 
parties, was to be valued separately and that the value of the 
right should not be confused with the sale of the water or 
the use to which it had been put prior, as the lower court 
allowed to occur in this case. The value of the water right 
itself, standing alone, was what was to be valued separate 
and apart from everything else. The Court's failure to consider 
the valuat.ion of the water right in this light was error. 
POINT II 
THE CONTROLLING OPINION ERRED IN ALLOWING THE VALUATION OF 
THE WATER RIGHTS AS PART OF THE PROPERTY WHICH ALREADY HAD 
BEEN PAID FOR. 
In this case, the parties stipulated that the value of 
the water rights should be considered separate and apart from 
the value of the other property condemned; the value the water 
rights would have by themselves in a sale to a willing third 
party buyer. However, the defendant changed its position at 
trial contending that the water right had to be valued with its 
-3-
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alleged special use in connection with the property previously 
paid for, contrary to the parties' stipulation dated t!ay 8, 1973, 
and states in Article 7 (R 31-32) as follows: 
7. In this action the defendant has made 
claim that the water rights from which well water 
was secured for use on the condemned properties had 
a market value at the time of the taking which would 
be reflected in the market value of the total proper-
ties, as a unit, so as to result in a total fair market 
value in excess of the aforesaid sum of $634,694.00; 
but plaintiff denies that such water right had value 
as contended by defendant. The value of such rights, 
if any, has been excluded from this stipulation. 
Should defendant contend, after any further 
meetings with plaintiff and/or additional research 
and investl0ation, that said water rights did have 
value at th~ time of the taking, and should plaintiff 
continue to contend that such rights had no value, or 
if the parties cannot otherwise resolve the issue, 
defendant may request that the matter of the value of 
such water rights, if any, be set for trial for rulings 
on such legal and factual issues as shall be pertinent 
to the matter, including such values, if any, for which 
defendant may be entitled to receive additional compen-
sation in this action. 
By this stipulation, the defendant agreed that the value 
of the water rights should be determined separate and apart from 
the properties that had already been paid for. Pursuant to this 
stipulation, the water rights, that is the right to remove water 
from under ground - not the use to which it had been placed - was 
the value to be determined. 
These water rights had a determinable value and that value 
was zero. As testified by Mr. C. Francis Solomon, Jr., M.A.I., 
and uncontested by defendant, a willing buyer could have obtained 
his own water rights for the same quantity and quality of water 
merely by applying for such rights to the State Engineer and 
drilling a well. According to the well drillers Mr. Solomon con-
-4-
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tacted, which testimony was also uncontested, for $8,000 
a single new eight inch well could be drilled and water obtained 
of like quality and quantity within a nile west, anywhere east, 
at least one mile north, and anywhere south of where the defen-
dant's wells were located. \vhy then would a willing buyer pay 
anything solely for the defendant's right to remove water from 
underground. The City had already paid for the wells and diversion 
facilities and there was no value in the defendant's vTater rights. 
Mr. Jay Bingham, a local and well respected water engineer, 
testified that he had been employeed by A. K. Properties prior 
to the trial and that under his supervision a sixteen inch well 
was drilled on A. K. 's property approximately one mile northwest 
of the defendant's property. The well was drilled to a level 
of 600 feet; however, Mr. Bingham testified th~t water down to 
the 300 foot level was of the same quality cr 02tter as that 
produced by the defendant's wells. He stated further that such 
water could have been produced in much greater quantities than 
that produced by the wells of defendant, proving that the water 
produced by defendant's wells was not unique and that it could 
have been obtained in the same area by others merely through 
applying to the State Engineer and drilling their own well. He 
too testified that defendant's water rights had no value for these 
reasons. (R 308-310). 
Mr. Dee C. Hansen, State Engineer, Division of Water 
Rights for the State of Utah, stated in the lower court case 
that defendant's water rights had no value because the area where 
the wr,lls were located was open to application for and drilling 
-5-
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of wells to obtain water under the sam2 type or water rights as 
those owned by defendant-respondent mereby by drilling a well 
(R 319-321). He also stated that there was no charge for the 
water used under such water rights (R 323). He stated further 
that water rights such as those held by defendant-respondent would 
have great value in aquifer basins where all surface rights and 
drilling rights were closed ($ 332). 
The testimony of these three witnesses has been completely 
ignored. 
POINT III 
THE CONTROLLING OPINION ERRED IN ASSUt1ING THAT PLAINTIFF CON-
DEMNED THE WATER RIGHTS AND RECEIVED THEM. 
Plaintiff, Salt Lake City Corporation, did not condemn 
the water right and in fact offered before and during trial 
(however the defendant refused for good reason) to allow defen-
dants to sell the water rights on the open market. The reason 
for the refusal was that they knew full well the water rights 
had no value and that they could not be sold to anyone in this 
aquifer basin and that the rights could not be transferred to 
another aquifer basin. Instead, they produced testimony to the 
effect that water rights located in other basins, where the 
State Engineer, Dee Hansen, has prohibited issuance of further 
drilling water rights and all of the surface water rights had 
been appropriated, had a value which was then assigned to the 
defendant's water rights in the Salt Lake City aquifer basin. 
Such water rights have no value in the Salt Lake City aquifer 
basin for the reason that they arc so readily attainable by any-
-6-
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one applying to the State Engineer and drilling for the water 
in this basin. The three aquifer basins referred to by the 
plaintiff in Heber, Corrinne, and Weber County are all closed 
to drilling and the surface water rights have been totally 
appropriated. Therefore, the sales used by the defendants in 
showing the value of water rights in those basins are inappro-
priate and inapplicable in the Salt Lake City basin and it was 
a travesty of justice and error to allow such into evidence. 
The plaintiff should not be forced to pay for something it 
did not get and cannot use. The certified water rights of the 
defendant have not been conveyed to the plaintiff nor were they 
sought in the complaint nor asked for in the action. The City 
should not be obliged to pay for something it did not want or 
receive. 
POINT IV 
THE CONTROLLING OPINION IGNORES THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SITUATIONS 
WHERE WATER RIGHTS ARE VALUABLE AND THIRD PARTIES CANNOT OBTAIN 
THE/1 OR SIMILAR ONES FOR THE REASON THAT THEY ARE NOT SOLD OR 
CANNOT BE OBTAINED BY APPLICATION, AND WHERE THE RIGHT IS SO 
READILY AVAILABLE BY PURCHASE OR APPLICATION, THAT NO ONE WILL 
BUY. 
As cited in Southern Pacific Co. vs. Arthur, 10 Utah 
2d 306, 352 P2d 693 (1960), the test for just compensation is 
as follows: 
... The standard of what is 'just compensation' in 
the ordinary case is market value of the property 
taken, that is what a willing buyer would pay 
to a willing seller .... 
The question is, would any willing buyer pay money for 
something that is worthless? 
-7-
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The plaintiff-appellant would be the first to con~2de 
that if the defendant's property and water rights had been 
located in Heber, Corrinne, or Weber County, in the areas where 
defendant obtained its comparables, the water rights would have 
a high value, probably at or near the value affixed by the 
defendant's appraiser, Memory Cain. However, the Heber, Corrinne 
and Weber water rights could not be transferred to any other 
aquifer basin and neither could the defendant's water rights be 
transferred to another aquifer basin. The aquifer basin in 
which the defendant's water rights are located was and is open 
to drilling to anyone filing an application with the State 
Engineer. For these reasons, Dee Hansen, the State's Water 
Engineer (R 319), Jay Bingham, a state water expert and engineer 
(R 288), and Francis Solomon, M.A.I., the City's expert real 
estate appraiser (R 246, 251) all testified that the defendant's 
water rights had no value. 
The Defendant stipulated that it could not sell these 
water rights to anyone in the Salt Lake City aquifer basin for 
the same reasons (R 177). The court erred in ignoring the fore-
going facts. 
Kennecott Copper Corporation vs. Salt Lake County, 122 
Utah 431, 250 P?d 1938 (1952), cited and relied upon in the 
controlling opinion, applies only to the situation where pro-
perty did not have value for one purpose, but did for another. 
Both Kennecott and the Sigurd v. State case (142 P2d 154) 
cited in the controlling opinion, addressed the situation where 
there was no market value because there had been no sales, but 
-8-
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the reason there had been no sales was a high value of the 
property and no one wanted to part with it. Whereas the 
reason there were no sales of water rights in the area where 
defendant's water rights were located was because similar rights 
could be obtained without cost. The court erred in ignoring 
this poles-apart difference. 
POINT V 
THE CONTROLLING OPINION ERRED IN UPHOLDING AND ACCEPTING 
COMPARABLES WHICH WERE NOT SIMILAR IN CHARACTER, LOCATION 
AND OTHER FACTORS. 
The case of State Road Commission vs. Larken, 27 
Utah 2d 295, 495 P2d 817 (1972), states as follows: 
... ~</hether evidence of the value of other 
property should be admitted depends on whether 
they are sufficiently similar in character, 
location and other factors which influence ~~e 
value that they meet the test of reasonaole~ 
comparability so they can reasonably be regaLded 
as having probative value as to the worth of 
the property in question. Because of the 
responsibility of the trial judge as the 
authority in charge of the trial, he is allowed 
considerable latitude in his judgment upon 
the matter; and his ruling should not be disturbed 
unless it appears he was clearly in error, and 
that this redownded to the prejudice of the com-
plaining party. (Emphasis added) (27 Utah 2d 299, 
quoting from State Road Commission vs. \qood, 
22 Utah 2d 317, 320; 452 P2d 872 (1969)) 
The controlling opinion erred as did the court below in 
accepting the properties used by defendant-respondent as com-
parables which were similar in character, location and other 
factors as the property condemned in this case. The water rights 
recited as being comparable by the defendant, located in Heber 
Valley, Corrinne, and Weber County, could not be replaced and 
similar rights could not be obtained by mere application to 
-9-
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the State Engineer. That is, NO OTHER WA'rER \'I!•S AVAILABLE, neither 
surface nor underground, for appropriation in those areas. There-
fore, the water rights had great value. Two of these water rights 
were surface water rights and not well water rights. Neverthe-
less, these three water rights had great value strictly because 
of their scarcity and the inability of anyone else to obtain 
similar water rights without buying them from the owner of the rights. 
In the case at bar, the defendant has water rights which 
allow removal of underground water by drilling in an area open 
to drilling by anyone who applies to the State Engineer for the 
same type of water rights which include the right to drill (R 320). 
Therefore, on this basis alone the three comparable sales cited 
by the defendant are totally dissimilar. In fact the three 
comparables are directly opposite to the situation of the water 
rights owned by the defendant. If such comparable rights were 
to be obtained at all, they could only be obtained by purchasing 
the rights from someone who owned them. In the defendant's case, 
such rights were readily available merely by application to the 
State Engineer and without cost. 
In this case then, the location of the comparable 
sales is critical because of the location of the aquifer basin 
in which the water rights are held. They are totally different 
from the water rights of the defendant and it was error for the 
lower court to allow such to be considered by the jury, and to 
be considered as controlling by this court. 
There are other points of dissimilarity but I will only 
mention one other. The comparables were sales of water ricJhts 
-10-
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only, not ~~lcs of alleged specialty water, as contended by 
defendant, in connection with the condemnation of a going 
business. 
CONCLUSION 
The defendant-respondent should not be given an 
undeserved windfall of $50,000, plus interest, for water rights 
which were and are still worthless. This is what defendant-
respondent will receive if the controlling opinion remains 
unchanged. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROGER F. CUTLER 
City Attorney 
RAY L. MONTGOMERY 
Assistant City Attorney 
101 City & Coc~ty Building 
Salt Lal:e C: t:', 'Jtah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
